We show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n-player Tullock tournaments assigns the entire prize pool to the winner, provided that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists. If such an equilibrium fails to exist under the winner-take-all structure, we construct the optimal prize structure which improves existence conditions by dampening efforts. If no such optimal equilibrium exists, no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium induces positive efforts. (JEL C7, D72, J31.
Introduction
It is well known that "an income maximizing contest administrator obtains the most rent-seeking contributions when he makes available a single, large prize" Clark and Riis (1998b) . Less, however, is known about effort maximizing prizes in Tullock contests when an equilibrium supporting this winner-take-all structure does not exist. The same is true when a generalized rent-seeking context is considered, i.e. if non-linear costs are allowed to accompany the outlays of more than two contestants. Unfortunately, both cases arise typically in the popular applications of the theory such as lobbying activities, research and development races, or competitions for promotions, to name but a few.
We show that with symmetric players the winner-take-all prize structure induces maximal efforts regardless of the number of players or their effort cost, provided that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium (SPSE) exists. In cases where such an equilibrium fails to exist under the winner-take-all prize structure, we construct prizes for the Tullock tournament which drastically improve existence conditions for SPSE over the winner-take-all case. These necessary and sufficient conditions for existence depend on the number of players-non-existence can be overcome by adding more players.
We proceed to identify the optimal, i.e. effort maximizing, prize structure among all structures for which SPSE exist and provide a procedure for finding such a structure whenever a SPSE exists. The driving force behind our results is, quite counter-intuitively, that multiple prizes reduce incentives for effort provision in the class of tournaments considered.
Besides the above mentioned Clark and Riis (1998b) , the paper closest to our analysis is Barut and Kovenock (1998) who analyze the fully discriminating, complete information all-pay auction (which is the limit case of our setup). In stark contrast to our results, they derive the near total arbitrariness of prize structures in their perfectly discriminatory setup where effort is the only determinant for winning. Adding incomplete information to this all-pay auction setup, Moldovanu and Sela (2001) show that more than one prize is optimal when contestants have convex costs. It may thus come as a surprise that our optimal prize structures are independent of the curvature of costs. The reason for this disparity is that their heterogenous players have private effort costs which affect bidding behavior. Intuitively, a second prize in an asymmetric contest can be desirable for the maximization of total efforts because a single first prize may undermine the incentives of both weak contestants expecting not to win and of strong contestants believing to be able to win with little effort.
1
We concentrate on SPSE because little is known about the properties of mixed strategies for imperfectly discriminatory success functions-particularly when existence of SPSE fails. We only know of two results: Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1994) show that mixed equilibria exist, can be solved for in principle, and provide a handful of discrete-grid examples. Alcalde and Dahm (2009) use a similar technique to address the (generalized) problem and show that in their mixed strategy equilibrium rents are fully dissipated. Neither result can be used to analyze mixed equilibria in our setup. Models featuring asymmetric pure strategy equilibria are presented by Cornes and Hartley (2005) , Szymanski and Valletti (2005) , and Siegel (2009) . We suspect that solving for the optimal prize structure of an asymmetric version of our model is possible in principle but would be technically challenging. A recent and comprehensive review of the tournaments literature is Konrad (2008) . It allows us to to omit all but the most relevant references and keep our literature review brief.
Our contribution shows that multiple prizes do not increase efforts in imperfectly discriminatory Tullock contests. At the contrary, they dampen incentives compared with a single prize. We exploit this feature of multi-prize configurations to obtain equilibrium existence when equilibria do not exist when the winner takes all. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of SPSE under any prize configuration and show how to construct these effort-optimal prizes whenever SPSE exist. Novel implications of our analysis include that a designer who suspects that a winner-take-all competition may overheat and fail to induce equilibrium efforts among contestants might be able to remedy this problem by either adding further prizes to the contest or by trying to attract more competitors. After introducing the model, all results are presented in the next section followed by a short discussion of their intuition. All proofs can be found in the appendix.
We consider a set N of n > 1 symmetric, risk neutral players engaging in a contest where any player i ∈ N exerts effort e i ∈ [0, ∞). There is a fixed prize pool P > 0 from which prizes P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n , P = l P l , awarded to the contest winner, second etc. are taken. The contest satisfies limited liability and the designer sets P l ≥ 0, l = 1, . . . , n in order to maximize the sum of efforts. Denote the vector of all players' efforts byê = (e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n ). Then the winning probability of player i exerting effort e i with her opponents choosingê −i is given by the Tullock success function as 
where we assume c(e i ) to be strictly increasing, differentiable, and satisfying c(0) = 0. Moreover, we assume that c ′ (e)e is a strictly increasing function of e.
3 Assuming the existence of SPSE for any given prize structure, our first result shows that the winner-take-all structure induces the highest efforts for arbitrary costs.
Proposition 1. (i) Under our assumptions, if SPSE exists for a given prize structure, then it is unique. (ii) If SPSE exists for any prize structure then the Tullock tournament which induces the highest sum of equilibrium efforts from symmetric contestants assigns the whole prize pool to the winner.
A corollary of this result, using the same proof, is that an optimal prize structure must be monotonic in the sense of P 1 ≥ P 2 ≥ · · · ≥ P n . The second proposition generalizes the linear cost result by Clark and Riis (1998b) in deriving a SPSE existence condition for the winner-take-all prize structure. From now on, we restrict attention to cost functions of the form c(e) = ae b with
Proposition 2. Existence of SPSE under the winner-take-all prize structure P 1 = P is ensured if
If condition (2) does not hold, then the existence of SPSE fails under the winner-take-all prize structure because, when all players adhere to the effort level of the unique SPSE-candidate, their utility decreases below their zero-effort utility. Thus this prize structure causes excessive efforts in the sense of the efforts being too costly to ensure the players' participation and therefore destroys the equilibrium. The case of the 'lottery' contest in which a single effort vector (e i ,ê −i ) determines the winning probabilities for a whole index set of prizes S with s = |S| ≤ n is similar. In this type of contest, player i's objective is arg max
i.e. there are s sequential, independent prize draws made for the top-ranked player from (e i ,ê −i ) to award s prizes.
incentives and existence, this contest equals the winner-take-all setup provided that the full set of prizes can be won by any single player.
We now analyze the optimal SPSE, i.e. the one which induces the highest efforts, in cases where under the winner-take-all prize structure P 1 = P no SPSE exists. We show that a more evenly distributed prize structure dampens efforts and extends the range of parameters where existence can be obtained.
Proposition 3. There is a monotonic prize structure for which SPSE inducing positive efforts exists, if and only if
Since the r.h.s. of (3) is increasing in the number of players n, adding players to the contest improves existence conditions. The highest possible effort in any SPSE is e * = c −1 (P/n). Given that (3) is satisfied, the designer can implement maximal equilibrium efforts e * by using a prize structure which tries first P 1 = P , then P 1 = P 2 = P/2, then P 1 = P 2 = P 3 = P/3 and so forth until the resulting effortsẽ eventually sink below e * . For the first such uniform prize structure he then shifts some ε > 0 away from the last prize k and subdivides it equally among the k − 1 prior prizes until the effortsẽ exactly equal e * . The following proposition formalizes this idea. (2) is violated but (3) holds, then there exists an integer 2 ≤ k < n and a real number 0 ≤ ε < 1 k P such that the prize structure
is optimal, i.e. induces the highest possible efforts e * = c −1 (P/n) = 1 a P n 1 b among all prize structures for which a SPSE exists.
Note that the optimal sum of the players effort n 1 a P n 1 b increases in the number of players if the cost function is convex and decreases if the cost function is concave.
4 Since (2) and (3) coincide for n = 2, existence conditions cannot be improved in this well known case.
No SPSE inducing positive efforts exists for monotonic prizes if (3) fails. The following picture illustrates the interplay of the above propositions. It shows the utility U i (e i ; e * ) of a player unilaterally
e i e i = e * U(e * ; e * ) = P/n − c(e * ) deviating from e * . The blue downward sloping curve depicts the locus of possible SPSE utility levels for different values of equilibrium effort. Recall that if (e * , . . . , e * ) is an SPSE, then players' utility is given by P/n − c(e * ).
There are two things to note: First, softening incentives through suboptimal multi-prize structures increases the players' equilibrium utility and therefore reduces equilibrium efforts (shifting from the green dashed utility levels to the red dotted utilities). Second, given the parameters of the contest, there are two possible ways to achieve the maximum effort equilibrium. On the one hand, if
, then the winner-take-all prize structure achieves this equilibrium (the solid blue utility level). On the other hand, if
, then there exists an optimal prize structure with more than one prize-described by proposition 4-which achieves the same maximal-effort in SPSE (the red dotted utility level). , the designer achieves the maximal SPSE efforts by awarding a single prize to the winner. However, if it is in his ability to control the parameters of the contest then he should strive to reduce the contestant's equilibrium utility through a more precise ranking, i.e. by increasing r. , the agent's utility in the SPSE candidate for a single prize is below her zero effort utility.
The designer can then increase the agent's equilibrium utility by dampening incentives through offering more than one prize. This multiplicity of prizes is motivated, however, not by optimality as such but solely by existence. Again, if the designer can influence the contest parameters, then he could reduce r by introducing more noise into the success function and thereby increase SPSE efforts. Moreover, the designer can ease the equilibrium existence problem in the case of multiple prizes by attracting additional participants.
Finally, the optimal prize structure (4), which enables the designer to collect maximal efforts, consists of no more than three distinct prizes where the highest and lowest prizes may optimally be awarded to multiple players.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of proposition 1. Denote the probability of player i winning the l th prize among s agents by
. . , e s ). Denote also by (ê/{j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j l−1 }) a vector of efforts of all players other than {j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j l−1 }. Then the probability of player i winning prize l ≥ 2 is given by
where the sums are taken over all ordered sets of l − 1 players different from i. Notice that f l i (·) only involves simple Tullock winning probabilities f 1 j (·). Since Player i maximizes (1), SPSE effortŝ e = (e, e, . . . , e) satisfy the f.o.c.
where we define α l (0) = 0. Coefficients α 1 , α 2 , and the general α l are calculated w.l.o.g. for player
1. The α * l are the symmetric equilibrium versions. (e 2r (n − 2) (n − 1) − e 2r 1 ) ((n − 2) e r + e 
Using the identity
n − x n − x + 1 = n − l + 1 n , we find the symmetric equilibrium expression as
which is decreasing in l for a given e, because the derivative of the first term in parenthesis is negative and, for constant n and r, the sum is increasing for l > 2. Notice, moreover, that the last coefficient α n must be negative since, for l = n, the above equals − 1 e r n n k=2
Hence the derivatives of the prize coefficients α are decreasing and P 1 = P induces the contestant's highest equilibrium utilities. Since equilibrium efforts depend on the prize structure, however, it may be the case that equilibrium efforts are higher for some other prize structure (not maximizing the players' utilities). In order to show that this is not the case, we define effort independent coefficients β l = eα l for l = 1, . . . , n and obtain the f.o.c.
Since we assume that c ′ (e)e is increasing in e this condition ensures that when a SPSE exists it is unique. Taking equilibrium existence as given, we assume that the s.o.c. holds locally at e * , i.e.
The solution e * is then defined implicitly by 1 e n l=1 β l P l = c ′ (e) or 1 e k − c ′ (e) = 0, where k is a 6 Thus only monotonic prize structures P 1 ≥ P 2 ≥ · · · can be optimal. Moreover, assigning a positive prize to the contest loser reduces efforts. The same extends to all cases where (8) is negative. Approximately, for large n, α l < 0 when ln(n) − ln(n − l + 2) > n−l n−l+1 or roughly l > 2e−n+en e ≈ 0.63n (e is the exponential constant in this footnote).
constant parameter. Therefore Proof of proposition 2. We first prove that when condition (2) holds then there exists a SPSE under the winner take all prize structure. We show that if all players other than player i ∈ N exert effort e * , then player i's best response is e = e * . Player i's utility is then U(e; e * ) = e r e r + (n − 1)(e * ) r P − ae b where e * = 1 ab
while, by playing e * , the player gets U(e * ; e * ) =
It is easy to show that both the first and second order conditions hold at e * when (2) (e r + (n − 1)(e * ) r ) 2 P − abe
which equals at a critical point x
Plugging the critical x b from (14) into the player's objective (12), we obtain
7 Deriving U (e; e * ) with respect to e gives d de U (e; e * ) as re r−1 (e r + (n − 1) (e * ) r ) − re 2r−1 (e r + (n − 1) (e * ) r )
(e r + (n − 1) (e * ) r ) 2 P − abe b−1 .
The second derivative gives
and (n − 2) r − nb < 0 ⇔ r b < n n−2 which holds because we require
Now, U(x; e * ) < U(e * ; e * ) implies that
which rearranges into
which is true for 0 ≤ x < e * precisely if (2) holds.
b) For e > e * , we proceed to show that U(e; e * ) − U(e * ; e * ) < 0 or e r e r + (n − 1) (e * ) r P − ae
Taking derivatives of U(e; e * ) − U(e * ; e * ) w.r.t. e gives
which is negative-and hence there is no further critical point for e > e * -if
Since the l.h.s. equals (e * ) b this can be rearranged to n (e * ) r+b e r−b < e r + (n − 1)(e * ) r . Define h(e) = n (e * ) r+b e r−b and g(e) = e r + (n − 1)(e * ) r -both strictly increasing functions in e. Notice that h and g intersect at e = e * . Moreover, d de (g(e) − h(e)) equals
.
Since for r ≤ n n−1 b the l.h.s is smaller than 1, this is true for all e > e * , thus g(e)−h(e) > 0 and (18) holds for all e > e * . As, given any prize structure, the symmetric equilibrium effort is unique, we also have the "only if" part. More precisely, if a symmetric equilibrium exists then U(e * ; e * ) ≥ U(0; e * )
only if
Proof of proposition 3. Assume a monotonic prize structure
P , for which a SPSE inducing positive efforts exists. We claim that if we change prizes to 1 n−1 (P − P n ) , . . . , 1 n−1 (P − P n ) , P n , then equilibrium efforts decrease, i.e.
This is true as we 'shift effort' from the first few prizes-with high weights β-to lower prizes.
Formally, there exists an index s, 1 ≤ s < n − 1, such that P l ≥ 1 n−1 (P − P n ) for any l = 1, . . . , s and P l < 1 n−1
Since n−1 l=1
and
we know that
and thus finally obtain that
Since for the original prize structure U(e * ; e * ) = P n − c(e * ) ≥ P n = U(0; e * ), we have the same inequality for the new prize structure (recall that c(e) is monotonically increasing). For this new prize structure-using the facts that β l = 0 9 and P n ≤ 1 n P -we have
Assume now that (3) holds. We show that we can find a prize structure 'close' to ( 1 n P, . . . , 1 n P ) for which a SPSE inducing positive efforts exists. Recall that a given prize structure induces a unique 8 If s = n − 1, then this was already the original prize structure and we are done.
symmetric equilibrium effort that solves (9), i.e.
where the coefficients β l are functions of n and r (independent of e and P ). Choose a small positive ε ≤ 1 n P and consider the prize structure (
. If a SPSE exists under this prize structure, then it induces a positive effort of
Since (3) holds, we indeed get that by exerting an effort of e * the player achieves a higher utility than what she can achieve by exerting zero effort (while all other players exert e * > 0), i.e.
U(e * ; e * ) = P n − c(e
This can be shown by expressing c (e * ) = To ensure a global maximum we need to show that for every e / ∈ {0, e * }, U(e; e * ) < U(e * ; e * ) where
a) We wish to show that for e > e * ,
d de
U(e; e * ) < 0 implies dU(e; e * )
By rearranging and multiplying by n k=2
r(n−1) n−1 l=1 1 (e r +(n−l)(e * ) r ) (31) and using the fact that (e Proof of proposition 4. We define k as the smallest integer such that the prize structure (4) induces a symmetric equilibrium effort (27) which is smaller or equal to the optimal effort c . We know that such an integer exists since the l.h.s. is decreasing in k (for k < n)
and since β l is decreasing with l we have since (2) is violated, and since (3) holds, we know that, for k = n − 1, it is true that . We thus need to show that given k we can find an 0 ≤ ε < 1 k P such that the prize structure (4) induces the optimal effort, i.e. 
We find ε by ensuring that the utility of the players is minimized and equal to zero, i.e.
(k − 1) 1 n P k
We also know that . Thus
Therefore we have
Finally we need to show that ε < 1 k P implying that
which follows from the definition of k. Using this in (36), we obtain efforts e * (k) as .
